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Hedger: Indian Law - The Validity of Tribal Severence Taxes without Secre

Indian Law-The Validity of Tribal Severance Taxes Without Secretarial
Approval. SouthlandRoyalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe, 715 F.2d 486 (10th
Cir. 1983).
The Southland Royalty Company, along with several oil companies,
has held oil and gas leases on the Navajo Indian Reservation in Utah since
the 1950's. 1 In 1978, the Navajo Tribal Council adopted a Possessory Interest Tax and a Business Activities Tax.2 The Possessory Interest Tax
requires any owner of a lease granted by the Navajos to pay an annual
tax on the value of the lease site and natural resources thereunder at a
rate between one and ten percent.3 The Business Activities Tax requires
anyone who is engaged in productive activities on the reservation to pay
a tax on the gross receipts from such activities at a rate of between four
and eight percent.' Southland Royalty Company 5 brought suit against6
the tribe and tribal officials to have the Navajo taxes declared invalid.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah held that
the Navajo taxes were invalid without the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior, which had not been obtained. 7 The district court agreed with
the oil companies that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 precluded
tribes from regulating oil activities on the reservation without approval
by the Secretary." The district court then concluded that tribes which had
organized under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)9 and had adopted
a constitution pursuant to that act, could retain the power to tax nonIndians, subject to secretarial review." The court held that without a tribal
1. Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe, 715 F.2d 486, 488 (10th Cir. 1983).
2. Brief for the United States and Federal Officials, Appellees and Cross-Appellants
at 6, Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe, 715 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Brief
for United States].
3. Id. at 7.
4. Id.
5. Also seeking a declaration that the Navajo taxes were invalid were the Phillips
Petroleum Company, Shell Oil Company, Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Superior Oil Company, Union
Oil Company of California, Wilshire Oil Company of Texas, Anadarko Production Company,
and Texaco, Inc. Southland, 715 F.2d at 486.
6. Id. at 488.
7. Id.
8. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, §§ 1-7, 52 Stat. 347-348 (1938) (current version at § 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-g (1976)), cited in Southland, 715 F.2d at 488. In particular see section 396d which provides that all "operations under any oil, gas, or other mineral
lease issued pursuant to the terms of sections 396a to 396g of this title or any other Act
affecting restricted Indian lands shall be subject to the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of the Interior."
9. The Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, §16, 48 Stat. 987 (1934) (current version
at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976)), provides in part that:
Any Indian tribe, or tribes residing on the same reservation, shall have the
right to organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and by-laws, which shall become effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe.., at a special election authorized
and called by the Secretary of the Interior under such rules and regulations
as he may prescribe. Such constitution and by-laws, when ratified as aforesaid
and approved by the Secretary of the Interior, shall be revocable by an election open to the same voters....
10. Record, Vol. 4, at 842-43, Southland,quoted in Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants
Phillips Petroleum Company, Shell Oil Company, and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. at 5, Southland
Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe, 715 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Phillips' Brief].
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constitution, comprehensive regulatory authority remained with the
Secretary of the Interior."
The Navajo tribe rejected adoption of the IRA by a majority vote as
expressly permitted by 25 U.S.C. § 478(a)." Therefore, the Navajos had
not subjected themselves to the provision in the Act requiring secretarial
review. The district court concluded that allowing non-organized tribes
an advantage over tribes that had adopted the IRA would undermine an
implicit Congressional policy of encouraging tribes to organize.' 3 Finally,
the court concluded that the relevant statutes" indicated that Congress
had generally intended the Secretary to review all oil and gas matters of
both organized and non-organized tribes. 5 On these grounds the district
court held that secretarial review of Navajo taxes was mandatory.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court.' 6 The court of appeals held that Indian taxation of oil
operations is a valid exercise of tribal authority. ' Furthermore, the court
could find no federal statute which required secretarial approval of tribal
taxes.'
Conoco Inc. v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes'" is a case decided in
the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming which raised
similar issues. The Conoco court held that tribes on the Wind River Reservation, who had not organized under the IRA, were free to levy oil
severance taxes without approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 20 Both
the Southland and Conoco courts analyzed notions of tribal sovereignty
in affirming the validity of these taxes.
BACKGROUND

Southland and Conoco are recent examples of a line of judicial opinions encouraging tribal autonomy and promoting a federal policy of favoring self government." Historically, the position of the courts and the
federal government has wavered between the extremes of encouraging
tribal self-sufficiency while at other times promoting total assimilation
of Indian tribes.12 A review of the case law shows that the present posi11. Id.
12. The Navajo Yearbook, 377 (1961), quoted in Brief for United States, supra note
2, at 6.
13. Southland, 715 F.2d at 489.
14. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-g (1976).
15. Southland, 715 F.2d at 489.
16. Id. at 490.
17. Id. at 488 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982)).
18. Southland, 715 F.2d at 489.
19. 569 F. Supp. 801 (D. Wyo. 1983).
20. Id. at 806.
21. See Southland, 715 F.2d. at 489. "The purpose of the IRA was to enable and encourage Indian self-government." See also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 566 F.2d
1085, 1086 (8th Cir. 1978).
22. See generally, Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of FederalProtection of Indian Autonomy and Self Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979 (1981).
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tion of the courts and of the federal government is in favor of Indian independence. For example, on the specific issue of taxation, the United
States Supreme Court recently held that the power of tribes to levy taxes
is not only a valid exercise of tribal sovereignty, it is necessary to effectuate self government."
As early as 1832, Justice Marshall, in the landmark case of Worcester
v. Georgia,24 held that Indian tribes possessed powers of self-government.
In 1904, the Supreme Court in Morris v.Hitchcock25 held that the Indian's
right to tax non-Indian activities on the reservation was a valid method
of paying for the cost of self-government. While many early decisions were
hostile to Indian claims, 6 the modern trend of cases is more in line with
the Morris approach.27 Thus, the Supreme Court in Washington V.Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation" held that tribes retain the
power to levy taxes unless it has been taken away by Congress.
In the recent case of Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe,2 9 the Supreme
Court held that the Jicarillas had the authority to levy an oil severance
tax against non-Indians. The Jicarilla tribe had organized under the IRA,
which authorized the tribe to adopt a constitution, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior.3 0 The Merrion court observed that the
tribe's interest in levying taxes to finance self-government is strongest
when the revenues are derived from activities on the reservation and the
taxpayer is receiving tribal services.3
Tribal sovereignty is, of course, subject to significant limitations. Congress' power over Indian affairs is plenary. 2 Indian tribes are free to act
only to the extent that no Congressional limitations exist." In United
States v. Wheeler, the Supreme Court noted that because the tribes have
been incorporated into the United States they have necessarily lost many
of the attributes of sovereignty.34 In Montana v. The United States, the
Supreme Court rejected the Crow Indians' argument that they could prohibit hunting on land within the reservation owned in fee by non-members
of the tribe as part of the inherent sovereignty of the tribe over the entire
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
194 U.S. 384 (1904).
See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 1886.
See generally Newton, FederalPower over Indians:Its Sources, Scope andLimita-

tions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 228-236 (1984).

28. 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980). Referring to United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978),
the Colville Court stated: "The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and
significantly involving a tribe or its is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes
retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status."
29. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
30. Id. at 134.
31. Id. at 138.
32. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 212-16 (1982).
33. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978).
34. 435 U.S. at 326. The Wheeler court also noted that many specific statutes and treaties
have also taken away many attributes of Indian sovereignty. Id. at 323.
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reservation. 35 In Oliphantv.Suquamish Indian Tribes, the Supreme Court
rejected a tribal claim of inherent sovereign authority to assert criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.36
Language in both Wheeler and Oliphant speaks of an implicit
37
divestiture of tribal sovereignty in matters concerning non-members.
However, in dicta in the Montana case, the power to levy taxes is specifically excluded from falling within the principles of the Oliphant case. 8
The inconsistency of the cases that held that Indians have been implicitly divested of attributes of their sovereignty and cases such as Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,3 9 which held that any abridgment of tribal
sovereignty should be clearly stated by a treaty, executive order, or act
of Congress, is critical to the specific issue of the need for secretarial approval of tribal taxes examined in Southland and Conoco.
SOUTHLAND AND CONOCO

The court of appeals in Southland reversed that part of the district
court's holding which conditioned the validity of the Navajos taxes upon
receiving approval of the Secretary of the Interior.4 0 The court first determined that Indian taxation of oil leases is necessary to defray the cost
of self-government and is therefore a valid exercise of tribal authority.4'
The court next considered whether there was any justification for the
district court's requirement that secretarial review was necessary before
the tribal taxing power could be exercised. The oil companies defended
the district court's holding by citing Wheeler, Oliphant,and Montana for
the principle that tribes have implicitly lost parts of their sovereignty
35. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
36. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
37. Id. at 208 (citing Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976 ). The Supreme
Court stated that "Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of
autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their status'." See also Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323, in which the Court said in dicta
that tribes could lose their sovereignty "by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status."
38. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566; see infra text accompanying note 72.
39. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
40. Southland, 715 F.2d at 490-91. The oil companies raised several other issues in
Southland which the court rejected or upon which it refused to render a decision. The court
disagreed with the oil companies that the Indian taxes offended the commerce clause, finding that the matter had been settled in Merrion, 455 U.S. at 130. The court also found that
dual taxation by both the tribe and the State of Utah was not unconstitutional, because
the oil companies had a taxable nexus with two governments. The oil companies also argued
that the taxes violated equal protection and due process. The court refused to consider these
issues, reasoning that because no tax had yet been collected, these issues had been raised
prematurely. The court clearly preferred not to decide this case on constitutional grounds.
The Conoco court also rejected a commerce clause challenge to the Shoshone and
Arapahoe Taxes. Conoco, 569 F. Supp. at 808.
41. Id at 488, (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,455 U.S. at 137). The Southland
court agreed that the tribal taxing power derived from "the tribe's general authority, as
sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged
in economic activities within that jurisdiction.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol20/iss1/6

4

Hedger: Indian Law - The Validity of Tribal Severence Taxes without Secre
1985

CASE NoTEs

because of their dependent status.'" They argued that no Congressional
action was necessary to place limitations on the Navajos because they
have been implicitly divested of any authority over non-Indians.41
Therefore, the oil companies suggested that it was absolutely necessary
for the Secretary of the Interior to supervise these taxes to protect their
Constitutional rights."
It is not clear from the Southland opinion how much consideration
the court gave to this "implicit divestiture" argument, but it was clearly
rejected.49 The court held that anyone attacking the Navajo's taxing power
must show that the
taxing power had been modified or divested by Con46
gressional action.
The court then searched the federal statutes to determine if secretarial
approval was expressly required. The oil companies advanced a two-tiered
argument based on the provisions of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of
193847 and the Indian Reorganization Act of 193448. The thrust of this
argument was that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act preempted the Navajos' power to tax oil operations and gives such power to the Secretary.4 9
The oil companies then pointed out that section 396b of the Mineral Leasing Act does not restrict the right of any tribe organized under the IRA
to lease lands for mining purposes.9 0 The argument followed that because
the Navajos had rejected the IRA, the tribal taxes should be subject to
the provisions
concerning secretarial review found in the Mineral Leas5
ing Act. 1
The court of appeals found no authority for this position. The court
noted that the same preemption argument had been rejected in the Merrion case. 52 The Southland court followed Merrion in holding that Congress had expressly allowed for the possibility of Indian severance taxes
in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. 53 Furthermore, the court noted that
42. See, e.g., Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant, Texaco, Inc. at 32-36, Southland
715 F.2d at 486 [hereinafter Texaco Brief]. See also Phillips' Brief, supra note 10, 13.
43. Texaco Brief, supra note 42, at 32.
44. Id.
45. 715 F.2d at 488.
46. Id.
47. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-g (1976).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
49. 25 U.S.C. § 396d (1976). See supra text accompanying note 8.
50. Phillips Brief, supra note 10, at 4.
51. The district court agreed with the oil companies:
[W]ith a tribal constitution approved by the Secretary, comprehensive
regulatory authority over oil and gas leasing on the reservation passes to the
tribe. Without a tribal constitution, that comprehensive regulatory authority
remains with the Secretary under 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-g. It appears to the court
that Congress intended to require Secretarial approval of tribal tax resolutions,
passed without benefit of a tribal constitution, if such resolutions could have
a significant effect on reservation oil and gas leases.
Record of the District Court, Vol. 4 at 842-43, quoted in Phillips Brief, supra note 10, at 4-5.
52. Southland, 715 F.2d at 489.
53. Natural Gas Policy Act, § 110, 15 U.S.C. § 3320(a), (c)(1) (1982), cited in Southland
715 F.2d at 489.
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the Natural Gas Policy Act makes no distinction between organized tribes
like the Jicarillas and non-organized tribes like the Navajos."'
The district court feared that the differing treatment of organized and
non-organized tribes might result in an advantage to tribes like the Navajos who have not adopted a constitution under the IRA.5 5 The Navajos
would be able to levy taxes free from secretarial approval while tribes like
the Jicarillas would be subject to this self-imposed requirement. The
district court felt this contravened a general Congressional intent that
tribes should be organized.16 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that
the purpose of the IRA was to encourage self-government. 7 The court
reasoned that allowing the tribes the choice of not organizing under the
IRA is itself an act of self-government. Requiring secretarial approval of
taxes impairs this policy of encouraging tribal independence.58
Furthermore, recognizing that the language of the Indian Mineral
Leasing Act of 1938 is ambiguous, the court of appeals cited Merrion for
the proposition that ambiguities in federal law are to be construed in such
a way as to further the federal policy of encouraging tribal selfsufficiency.9
The Wyoming District Court in Conoco v. Shoshone and Arapahoe
Tribes entertained many of the same arguments asserted by the oil companies in Southland and found further reasons to reject them. The Conoco court found that the requirement of secretarial approval asserted in
Merrion was self-imposed by the Jicarillas, and therefore the case did not
hold that all tribal taxes be subject to review by the Secretary. 8 While
the Shoshones and Arapahoes are not organized under the IRA, the court
found that sufficient restraints existed on the tribe to protect the oil
companies. 61The court reasoned that Congress has the power to take away
tribal authority to tax if it is abused and that federal law insures that
those under tribal jurisdiction have constitutional protections. 2 Also, the
court placed some credence in the fact that, as a practical matter, the tribe
is restrained by economic and political considerations. 3
54. Southland, 715 F.2d at 489. The statute defines "Indian Tribe" for the purpose
of the Natural Gas Policy Act: "The term 'Indian tribe' means any Indian tribe recognized
as eligible for services provided by the Secretary of the Interior to Indians." Natural Gas
Policy Act, § 106, 15 U.S.C. § 3316(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1976).
55. Southland, 715 F.2d at 489.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id. at 490 citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe
v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1980): "Ambiguities in federal law have been construed
generously in order to comport with.., traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal
policy of encouraging tribal independence").
60. Conoco, 569 F. Supp. at 806.
61. Id.

62. Id. citing the Indian Civil Rights Act, § 202, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
63. Conoco, 569 F. Supp. at 806. The court noted that economic restraints "prevent
the Tribes from total arbitrary 'confiscation,' and this case itself is evidence that challenge
to the tax is possible."
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Finally, the Conoco court considered the argument that Congress must
have intended tribes to organize. Otherwise, no tribe would adopt the IRA
and impose upon themselves the constraint of secretarial approval.6 The
court explained that there were many benefits offered under reorganization and it was not merely a choice between self-imposed secretarial review
and non-organization free of such a burden.6 The court noted that adoption of the IRA was clearly optional and, at any rate, the tribes already
had 66
many of the attributes of sovereignty expressly provided for in the
Act.

SOUTHLAND AND CONOCO CONTINUE THE TREND
OF ENCOURAGING TRIBAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Both Southland and Conoco are consistent with the great weight of
modern authority which upholds Indian sovereignty unless it has been
divested by an act of the federal government.67 Specifically, the Supreme
Court in Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, held that the power to levy
taxes is essential to self-government. 8
The current trend of promoting tribal self-government is not only
found throughout the case law, but is reflected in a number of Congressional enactments indicating a firm policy of encouraging tribal selfsufficiency and economic development.6 9 In the area of oil and gas activities
specifically, the Secretary's control is not all-inclusive. 0 The lower court's
requirement in Southland of secretarial review of tribal taxes runs contrary to both common and statutory law regarding Indian sovereignty
and the court of appeals correctly recognized
that no support for this posi7
tion could be found in the statutes. '
The oil companies' argument in Southland,that the Navajo have been
implicitly divested of the authority to tax, is simply without merit. The
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 807.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983).
455 U.S. at 130.
For example, The Indian Financing Act of 1974 provides:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to provide capital on a reimbursable basis to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and
human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for the
utilization and management of their own resources and where they will enjoy
a standard of living from their own productive efforts comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities.
Indian Financing Act of 1974, § 2, 25 U.S.C. §1451 (1976).See also H. R. REP. No. 1804,
73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934), which declares the policy of the Indian Reorganization Act.
"[B]roadly the measure proposes to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him
a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism."
70. See, e.g., Poafybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365 (1968), which held that nothing
in the regulatory scheme for supervision by the Secretary of the Interior of oil and gas leases
impedes an Indian's right to maintain an action to protect his lease.
71. Southland, 715 F.2d at 489.
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case of Montana v. United States, relied on by the oil companies, is clearly not applicable to Indian taxation of non-members.72
The principle that only the federal government may limit a tribe's
exercise of its sovereign authority, is well-established. 3 Therefore, if the
requirement of secretarial approval of tribal taxes is valid, such a requirement must be found in the federal statutes. A 1964 report of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights found:
Although the Secretary's power to approve tribal ordinances
and resolutions might be authorized by Federal law, regulation
and by provision in a tribe's constitution or charter, the subcommittee, in its research and consultation with officials in the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, has failed to uncover any Federal statute which
specifically requires secretarial approval of tribal ordinances. The
of tribal
most clearly defined authority for secretarial approval
4
ordinances is contained in the tribal constitutions.
Tribes such as the Jicarilla Apache have imposed secretarial review
on themselves by organizing under the IRA. To argue that the Merrion
decision imposes secretarial review on tribes like the Navaj os, Shoshones,
and Arapahoes, who are not organized, indicates a faulty understanding
of the IRA. The IRA was clearly optional and the Navajos are free to reject adoption of it." Nothing in the IRA imposes a penalty of secretarial
review on those tribes who choose not to adopt the Act.76
Finally, no support for the requirement of secretarial approval of taxes
can be found in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938.17 To argue that
the delegation of regulatory authority over oil and gas leases preempts
the power of tribes to tax in favor of the Secretary ignores the express
language of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, which allows for Indian
severance taxes."' At the very least, to ask the court to conclude that Congress, without mentioning the word "tax," somehow meant to limit the
power to tax, requires the court to resolve an ambiguity. The great weight
72. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 566. Referring to Oliphant,which divested
tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-members, the court in Montana said in dicta:
Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in criminal
matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that
the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities
of non-members of the Tribe. To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign
power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.... A Tribe
may regulate, through taxation .... the activities of non-members who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe....
73. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). For a further example of the extent to which recent decisions have upheld tribal sovereignty, see Donovan
v. Navajo Forest Products Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982). In Donovan the court concluded that unless Congress expressly commanded otherwise, the Occupational Health and
Safety Act (OSHA) did not apply to Navajo business.
74. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUMMARY REPORT OF HEARINGS AND
INVESTIGATIONS BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,

3 (1964).
75. 25
76. 25
77. 25
78. 15

C.F.R.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

88th Cong., 2d Sess.

§ 81.7 (1984.
§ 476 (1976).
§§ 396a-g (1976).
§ 3320(al{c)(1) (1976).
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of authority compels 7a9 court to resolve ambiguities in federal statutes in
favor of the Indians.
CONCLUSION
Both the Southland and Conoco courts correctly recognized that the
fate of Navajo and Shoshone and Arapahoe severance taxes lies in the
hand of Congress and not in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior.
In future years, Congress may well impose limits on Indian taxing power
if our energy needs dictate that it must. Until Congress acts, such taxes
are valid.
Tribes must recognize that their sovereignty is always in danger of
complete divestment. Historically, federal Indian policy has fluctuated
between eras which favored total assimilation of tribes, and eras such as
the present one, which encourage tribal independance. 8' The recent successes of Indians in asserting tribal rights has prompted proposals in Congress from those who oppose Indian autonomy."' Therefore, when drafting taxes, tribal leaders and tribal attorneys should not interpret South'land and Conoco as giving them free rein to disregard practical political
and economic limitations on the taxing power. All tribal taxes must be
levied with a concern for what is reasonable, and an eye to the prevailing
national energy policy. In this way the tribes can assure themselves that
Congress will not invoke its plenary power.
JEFF HEDGER

79. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
80. Clinton, supra note 22, at 979.

81. See, e.g., H.R. 13329, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. 19,433 (1978. Representative Cunningham proposed (never enacted) a bill "to direct the President to abrogate all
treaties entered into by the United States with Indian Tribes in order to accomplish the purposes of recognizing that in the United States no individual or group possesses subordinate
"
or special rights ..
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